Introduction
Fairness in concurrent systems has been discussed for decades. There is even a book on the subject [8] . The best-known attempt to characterize fairness was probably Apt, Francez, and Katz's definition of three criteria for fairness notions [5] . We have learned much about trace-based formalisms since then, and I believe the definition of fairness is now fairly obvious. While any precise formalization of a vague concept is open to dispute, there does seem to be only one language-independent definition that distinguishes fairness from liveness. That definition appears to have been mentioned only by Abadi and Lamport [2, page 89] and Schneider [17, pages 254-257] . My purpose here is to re-examine the question of fairness in light of what has been learned in the last ten years.
Fairness for properties in an arbitrary trace-based formalism is defined in Sect. 2 . Fairness usually appears in the guise of fairness conditions on actions in action systems. Section 3 reviews action systems-a simple abstraction that covers programs and many kinds of specifications-and recalls the definition of weak and strong fairness for actions. Section 4 generalizes weak and strong fairness and defines hyperfairness, a very strong form of fairness for actions. Hyperfairness generalizes the concept of the same name introduced by Attie, Francez, and Grumberg [6] . Section 5 extends the criteria of Apt, Francez, and Katz to arbitrary action systems and discusses these criteria. A concluding section muses upon what it all means.
Much of the material presented here is a review of wellknown concepts; its presentation is quite terse. More loquacious expositions can be found in the cited literature. Proofs of the new results are not hard and are left mostly to the reader.
Fairness and machine closure
I assume a trace-based semantics in which a behavior is a sequence 1 of states and a property is a predicate on behaviors. Everything translates easily to a formalism (such as I/O automata [13] ) in which a behavior has action names attached to each state transition. 2 In the informal discussion, I identify a property with the set of behaviors satisfying it, so R ⇒ T and R ⊆ T are two ways of asserting that if a behavior satisfies property R, then it satisfies property T . However, formally, a property is a predicate on behaviors. Properties can be expressed as formulas in a temporal logic, but in this section, I make no assumption about how they are expressed.
The meaning of a system specification 3 is a propertynamely, the set of behaviors representing a correct system execution. Any statement about specifications that is independent of the particular language in which the specification is written must be a statement about properties.
A safety property is one that is satisfied by an infinite behavior iff it is satisfied by each finite prefix of the behavior [4] .
With the standard topology on sequences, 5 safety properties are closed sets. Let C(R) be the closure of property R in this topology, so C(R) is the strongest safety property implied by R.
A property L is a liveness property iff any finite prefix of a behavior can be extended to an infinite behavior that satisfies L. In the standard topology on sequences, liveness properties are dense sets. A theorem of topology implies that every property can be written as the conjunction of a safety property and a liveness property [4] .
A pair S , L of properties is machine closed [1] iff S is equivalent to C(S ∧ L). This means that S , L is machine closed iff every finite sequence satisfying S can be extended to an infinite sequence satisfying S ∧ L.
Most methods for writing specifications, including CCS, Unity, and I/O automata, use some form of automaton to specify a safety property. The automaton asserts the property S consisting of all state sequences that the automaton can generate. In some of these methods, one also specifies a liveness property L-either implicitly (as in Unity), or by writing L explicitly (as in I/O automata). I will call the specification machine closed iff S , L is machine closed.
Machine closure of an automaton-based specification means that, as long as the automaton behaves correctly (keeps its safety property S satisfied), it can never reach a state in which it is impossible to satisfy S ∧ L. In other words, the automaton can never "paint itself into a corner." A specification that purports to describe an implementation should be machine closed. However, one sometimes writes high-level specifications that are not machine closed. (An example is the specification of a serializable database in [10] .)
In a number of methods, liveness is specified with so-called fairness conditions on the automaton. The common feature of all these conditions is that they produce machine-closed specifications. The only sensible definition of fairness that is independent of any specification language seems to be:
In this definition, the safety property 6 S plays the role of the automaton (or program) that appears, sometimes implicitly, in traditional notions of fairness.
We choose a fairness property L for a property S in order to write the specification S ∧ L. We can replace L by any other
It follows from simple results of topology that if S , L is machine closed, then ¬S ∨ L is a liveness property. Since, we can always replace a fairness property L with the liveness property ¬S ∨L, we could require that a fairness property be a liveness property-as most are in practise. However, it is simpler not to make this requirement.
Any property L is a fairness property for some safety property-in particular, for the safety property C(L). We are interested in whether L is a fairness property for a given safety property S . We don't care that there exists some other safety property for which L is a fairness property.
In the rest of this paper, we are concerned only with safety properties that are generated by action systems. Augmented with a method of hiding variables, action systems can express any safety property. However, we restrict our attention to fairness for action systems without hiding, which can express only a much more limited class of safety properties.
Fairness for action systems
An action system 7 8 For example, consider the action system with initial condition x = y = 0 and the two actions A 1 , which increments x by 1, and A 2 , which increments y by 1. These actions are defined formally by:
The safety property specified by this action system is:
The subscript v (which equals x , y in the example) permits "stuttering" steps that do not change any relevant variables. This subscript is crucial for refinement and composition, but it is irrelevant when considering only a single specification. I will therefore omit all subscripts, and write
The reader familiar with TLA should be able to figure out how to re-introduce the subscripts. However, it is important that the safety property of an action system allow halting, which is represented by a behavior ending in an infinite sequence of stuttering steps. The action [A] is true for any stuttering step.
For the rest of this section and for Sect. 4, let us assume a fixed action system with initial predicate Init and system actions A i , and let us define N and S by
Formula S is the system's safety property, and action N is called its next-state relation. An action A is enabled in a state s iff there exists a state t such that s, t satisfies A. The operators WF and SF are defined by
where Enabled A is the predicate asserting that A is enabled. Formula WF(A), called weak fairness on A, asserts that if A eventually becomes enabled forever, then infinitely many A steps must occur. Formula SF(A), called strong fairness on A, asserts that if A is infinitely often enabled-even though it may also be infinitely often disabled-then infinitely many A steps must occur. Since eventually forever implies infinitely often, SF(A) implies WF(A) for any action A, so strong fairness is stronger than weak fairness.
Almost all fairness conditions for action systems that arise in real examples can be easily expressed as weak or strong fairness on actions. For example, the requirement If any of the actions A 1 , . . . , A k is ever enabled infinitely often, then a step satisfying one of those actions must eventually occur.
The following proposition, proved by Abadi and Lamport [3] , shows that if A implies the nextstate relation N , then weak and strong fairness on A are indeed fairness properties.
Proposition 1 If S is defined by (2) and L is a finite or countably infinite conjunction of formulas of the form WF(A) and/or SF(A), where each
A implies N , then S , L is machine closed.
Generalizing weak and strong fairness
Operators GWF and GSF that generalize weak and strong fairness can be defined by replacing Enabled A with an arbitrary predicate P in the definitions of WF and SF:
(The concept of generalized fairness seems to have been defined first by Francez and Kozen [9] .) Although these operators are not used in ordinary TLA specifications, they occur implicitly in TLA reasoning. When proving that a specification T 1 implies another specification T 2 , we must substitute state functions for bound (hidden) variables of T 2 . Let F denote the result of performing such a substitution on a formula F . Proving T 1 ⇒ T 2 requires proving that the fairness conditions of T 1 imply the barred fairness conditions of T 2 , which may include formulas like WF(B ). Since barring (which is just substitution) distributes over ordinary operators like ⇒, ✷, and ✸, the formula WF(B ) equals GWF(Enabled B , B ). However, it need not equal WF(B ) because barring does not distribute over Enabled , so Enabled B does not necessarily equal Enabled B [12] . The same situation arises with SF formulas. Hence, we must prove that the WF and SF properties of T 1 imply the GWF and GSF properties of T 2 . The standard TLA rules for reasoning about WF and SF contain the appropriate barred formulas [12, Fig. 5] . Those rules have straightforward generalizations in which all formulas of the form WF(C ) and SF(C ) are replaced by formulas GWF(P , C ) and GSF(P , C ), for arbitrary predicates P .
The properties GWF(P , A) and GSF(P , A) are not always fairness properties, even when A implies the next-state relation N . For example, GWF(true, A) and GSF(true, A) equal ✷✸A. This property, called "unconditional fairness" on A, is not, in general, a fairness property. For example, S , ✷✸false is machine closed iff S equals false.
I now give some necessary and sufficient conditions for GWF and GSF formulas to yield fairness properties. These conditions are not pretty, and expressing them requires some additional notation. Let "·" be action composition, defined by letting s, t satisfy A · B iff there exists a state u such that s, u satisfies A and u, t satisfies B . Define A * · B by
We now define three operators:
Since P implies Enabled (N * · P ), the monotonicity of Enabled implies gs(P , N , A) ⇒ gw (P , N , A) .
The following proposition provides a necessary and sufficient condition for a GWF or GSF formula to be a fairness property. (2) and L equals either GWF(P , A) or GSF(P , A), for state predicate P and action A, then S , L is machine closed iff S implies ✷gw (P , N , A) . 10 While not difficult, the proof of this proposition may help explain the rather obscure definitions of h and gw , so we sketch it here. 1. If S , GSF(P , A) is machine closed, then so is S , GWF(P , A) . Proof . By the general result that S , F machine closed and F ⇒ G imply S , G machine closed. 9 The "P ⇒" in the definition of gw is redundant and is included for symmetry. All these operators can be expressed in terms of the weakest invariant operator win [11] , since Enabled (N * · B ) is equivalent to ¬win (N , ¬Enabled B ) , for any action B . A state predicate Q is considered to be an action by letting s, t satisfy Q iff s does. 10 For a state predicate Q, the formula S ⇒ ✷Q asserts that Q holds for every state of every behavior satisfying S . N , A) . Proof . Assume S does not imply ✷gw (P , N , A) . Then there exists a finite behavior τ satisfying S whose last state τ f satisfies ¬h(N , A) ∧ ¬Enabled (N * · ¬P ). Since τ f satisfies ¬h (N , A) , by definition of h, this implies that every extension of τ satisfying ✷N has no more A steps. Since τ f satisfies ¬Enabled (N * · ¬P ), predicate P is forever true in every extension of τ satisfying ✷N . Hence every extension of τ satisfying S satisfies ¬GWF(P , A) , contradicting the machineclosure assumption. (P , N , A) , then S , GSF(P ,
Proposition 2 If S is defined by

If S , GWF(P , A) is machine closed, then S ⇒ ✷gw (P ,
If S ⇒ ✷gw
In case (i), we can extend τ to a behavior satisfying S ∧ GSF(P , A) by taking a finite (possibly null) sequence of N steps, and then stuttering forever. In case (ii), we can extend τ with a finite sequence of N steps followed by an N ∧ A step, and then repeat the construction, obtaining an infinite extension satisfying S ∧ GSF(P , A).
A specification usually requires the conjunction of fairness conditions for a set of actions, not just fairness for a single action. There seems to be no simple, weakest requirement for an arbitrary conjunction of GWF and GSF formulas to be a fairness property. However, the following is a rather powerful generalization of Proposition 1. Its proof is based on essentially the same construction used in step 3 in the proof above, except that τ must be repeatedly extended to satisfy the fairness properties for the different actions. This means that the stuttering construction can't be used, so we need the stronger gs formula for GSF properties. The detailed proof is similar to that of Proposition 1 and is omitted.
Proposition 3 If S is defined by (2) and L is a finite or countably infinite conjunction of formulas, each of which is either (i) of the form GWF(P , A) where S implies ✷gw (P , N , A) or (ii) of the form GSF(P , A) where S implies ✷gs(P , N , A), then S , L is machine closed.
It would seem appropriate to reserve the term hyperfairness for the strongest general fairness condition on an action that is a fairness property. This would mean finding, for an action A, the weakest predicate P for which GSF(P , A) is a fairness property. However, such a P does not, in general, exist. For example, define
Any finite behavior satisfying S can be extended to one satisfying S ∧ ✸✷¬Q(i ), hence satisfying S ∧ GSF(Q(i ), A), for any number i . Thus, GSF(Q(i ), A) is a fairness property. Suppose there were a weakest P such that GSF(P , A) is a fairness property. Then each Q(i ) must imply P , so Q implies P . Hence, because GSF is antimonotonic in its first argument, GSF(P , A) implies GSF(Q, A), so GSF(Q, A) must be a fairness property. (See step 1 in the proof of Proposition 2.) But, S implies ✷Q ∧ ✷¬A, which implies ¬GSF(Q, A), so GSF(Q, A) is not a fairness property. Hence, there can be no weakest P for which GSF(P , A) is a fairness property.
While there is no strongest fairness property GSF(P , A) for an arbitrary A, Proposition 2 and the definition of gw suggest taking P to be h (N , A) . We therefore define the hyperfairness operator HF by
While not in general the strongest possible fairness property for action A, it is still quite strong. It asserts that infinitely many A steps must occur if, infinitely often, a state is reached in which some possible sequence of N steps could enable A. Proposition 3 implies that the conjunction of any finite or countably infinite collection of hyperfairness properties is a fairness property.
The definitions of S and h(N , A) imply that, for any behavior s 0 , s 1 , . . . satisfying S and for any n, if s n satisfies h(N , A), then s m satisfies h(N , A) for every m < n. This implies: N , A) , A), so it doesn't matter whether we use GSF or GWF in the definition of HF.
Proposition 4 If S is defined by (2), then S implies that ✷✸h(N , A) is equivalent to ✷h(N , A), for any action A.
This proposition shows that S implies the equivalence of GSF(h(N , A), A) and GWF(h(
Attie, Francez, and Grumberg defined a tiny toy programming language called IP , based on multi-party CSP-style synchronization, and they defined hyperfairness for IP programs as follows [6] :
Definition (Hyperfairness). If P is an IP program in which every top-level interaction is conspiracy-resistant, then an infinite computation π is hyperfair iff . . . . If P is an IP program in which not every top-level interaction is conspiracy-resistant, then every computation π of P is hyperfair.
The " . . . " is a condition that, in the context of the definition, is equivalent to the conjunction of hyperfairness properties for certain actions. It is in this sense that HF generalizes their definition of hyperfairness.
Hyperfairness asserts that something must happen infinitely often if it is infinitely often possible, where the "something" is a step that satisfies an action. Predicate reachability fairness, introduced by Queille and Sifakis [8, 16] , makes the same assertion, except the "something" is the truth of a state predicate. Predicate reachability fairness is the special case of hyperfairness when the action is a state predicate (an action that depends only on the initial state).
The criteria of Apt, Francez, and Katz
Apt, Francez, and Katz (henceforth called AFK) gave three "appropriateness" criteria for fairness notions in a programming language: feasibility, equivalence robustness, and liveness enhancement [5] . Although their abstract promised to consider "relations among various languages and models for distributed computation", they discussed mainly programs written in CSP-like languages with multi-party interactions. I now
generalize their criteria to arbitrary action systems, remaining as faithful as possible to AFK's intentions and notation. Afterwards, I discuss the criteria and show that they are satisfied by a large class of hyperfairness properties.
The criteria redefined
For any action system P, let N P and S P be the action N and property S defined by (2) , and let comp(P) be the property S P ∧ WF(N P ). Assume some class A of action systems. A fairness notion F is a mapping that assigns a subset F(P) of S P to every system P in A such that F(P) contains all finite computations in S P . AFK defined the fairness notion F to be feasible iff S P , WF(N P ) ∧ F(P) is machine closed, for every P in A.
AFK defined their second criterion, equivalence robustness, only when all system actions are deterministic and mutually disjoint. In that case, a behavior s 0 , s 1 , . . . in S P is uniquely determined by the initial state s 0 and the sequence A k (1) , . . . of system actions such that s n , s n+1 satisfies A k (n) , for each n. We can therefore consider a behavior to consist of an initial state and a sequence of system actions. For behaviors π and ρ, AFK defined π ≡ ρ iff π can be obtained from ρ by (possibly infinitely many) simultaneous transpositions of two independent [system] actions.
where system actions A i and A j are independent iff they commute-that is, iff A i · A j is equivalent to A j · A i . We can then define a property R to be equivalence robust for the system P iff, for any pair of behaviors π, ρ such that π ≡ ρ, behavior π satisfies R iff behavior ρ does. AFK defined F to be equivalence robust iff F(P) is equivalence robust for P, for all P in A.
To extend this definition to arbitrary action systems, we need to generalize AFK's definition of ≡. Without the assumption that system actions are pairwise disjoint and deterministic, it is not obvious what is meant by the simultaneous transpositions of infinitely many actions. The next paragraph defines π ✄ ρ to mean that π differs from ρ by the transposition of two adjacent actions, defines π → ρ to mean that ρ is obtained from π by a convergent sequence of such transpositions, and defines π ≡ ρ to mean π → ρ and ρ → π.
Let σ i denote state i of a behavior σ, so σ equals σ 0 , σ 1 , . . . . Define π ✄ ρ to mean that there exists a natural number n such that, (i) π m = ρ m for all m = n + 1, and (ii) for any system actions A and B , if ρ n , ρ n+1 satisfies A and ρ n+1 , ρ n+2 satisfies B , then π n , π n+1 satisfies B and π n+1 , π n+2 satisfies A. This definition is illustrated pictorially on top of the page.
Let ¤ mean ✄ or =. Define π → ρ to be true iff there exists an infinite sequence
for all k , and (iii) for every n there exists an m such that σ
Having defined ≡ for an arbitrary action system, we can define equivalence robustness as before: property R is equivalence robust for P iff π ≡ ρ implies that π satisfies R iff ρ does; and F is equivalence robust iff F(P) is equivalence robust for P, for all P in A.
AFK's third criterion, liveness enhancement, essentially asserts that there is some P in A such that comp(P) ∧ F(P) is not equivalent to comp(P). 12 
The criteria re-examined
Feasibility of F is almost the same as requiring that F(P) be a fairness property for S P , for all P in A. The two requirements are not the same because AFK made WF(N P ) an intrinsic assumption about an action system rather than just a particularly weak fairness property. This accords with the common practice of calling "unfair" an execution of a multiprocess program that satisfies only this fairness property. While it is fruitless to argue with a definition, I believe that the fundamental nature of safety and machine closure suggests that it is unproductive to distinguish WF(N P ) from other fairness properties. Indeed, defining fairness to mean machine closure makes even true a fairness property. Ad hoc restrictions to rule out such "trivial" fairness properties seem pointless.
Equivalence robustness of F requires that F(P) be equivalence robust for P, for every P in A. Unlike fairness, equivalence robustness depends on the actual action system P, not just on its safety property S P . To show this dependence, I now construct two action systems P 1 and P 2 with equivalent safety properties (so the systems are semantically equivalent) and a property L that is equivalence robust for one and not the other.
Let P 1 be the action system considered in Sect. 3 that has initial predicate x = y = 0 and actions A 1 and A 2 defined by (1); let A 2> be the action (x > y) ∧ A 2 ; and let L be the property ✷✸A 2> . Let π be the behavior obtained by alternately performing A 1 and A 2 actions, starting with an A 1 action; and let ρ be the same as π, except starting with an A 2 action. Since π can be obtained from ρ by interchanging each A 1 action with the following A 2 action, we have ρ ≡ π. Since x > y holds in π at the beginning of each A 2 step and never holds in ρ, behavior π satisfies L and behavior ρ does not. Hence, L is not equivalence robust for P 1 .
ply commute-that is, commute for all pairs of states. It makes no difference to the ensuing discussion whether or not we change the definition of ✄, and hence of ≡, in this way. 12 AFK actually stated liveness enhancement in terms of terminating programs. As they observed, their definition is equivalent to this one for the particular class of programs they were considering.
Let P 2 be the system with the same initial predicate x = y = 0 and the four actions A 1≤ , A 1> , A 2≤ , and A 2> , where the three new actions are defined by:
Property L, which asserts that infinitely many A 2> actions occur, is obviously equivalence robust for P 2 .
Since N P1 is equivalent to N P2 , the systems P 1 and P 2 have the same safety property. Thus, we have two semantically equivalent action systems and a property that is equivalence robust for one but not the other.
Under extremely weak hypotheses, we can show that for any action system P, there exists a semantically equivalent action system (one defining the same safety property) P such that every property is equivalence robust for P. We simply define P to have a separate system action for every pair of states that satisfies N P .
Since equivalence robustness is not a semantic property of a system, but depends on how the system is represented, it is unlikely to be a useful concept-except perhaps for action systems expressed in a language that severely restricts how they can be represented.
Liveness enhancement of F, AFK's final criterion, asserts that there exists some P in A for which F(P) is stronger than WF(N P ). It rules out the fairness notion that assigns WF(N P ) to every system P, reflecting AFK's decision not to consider WF(N P ) to be a fairness property. They may also have been trying to rule out trivial ways of defining a fairness notion that satisfies all three criteria. However, Attie, Francez, and Grumberg's definition of hyperfairness shows that there is a simple way to define F to satisfy all the criteria: (i) find a subclass of action systems for which there exists some equivalence-robust fairness property, and (ii) define F(P) to be that property if P is in the subclass, and to equal true otherwise. For example, take the subclass consisting of those P for which S P implies that every system action is always enabled, and define F(P) to equal ∀ i : ✷✸A i for all P in this subclass.
Hyperfairness and the AFK conditions
Attie, Francez, and Grumberg proved that their definition of hyperfairness satisfies the three AFK conditions. Let's see if this is true of my definition of hyperfairness.
Feasibility follows directly from Proposition 3. To satisfy liveness enhancement, we would have to define a class of action systems and some particular conjunction of hyperfairness formulas for each action system in that class. This is a simple exercise and is omitted.
We are left with equivalence robustness. The conjunction of properties is equivalence robust if each conjunct is, so we need consider only individual hyperfairness formulas. For an arbitrary action A, the hyperfairness formula h(N P , A) need not be equivalence robust for action system P. For example, H (N P1 , A 2> ) is not equivalence robust for P 1 , where P 1 and A 2> are the system and action defined above. However, we can prove the following result: Proposition 5 If P is an action system and A is the disjunction of system actions of P, then HF(N P , A) is equivalence robust for P.
To prove the proposition, we assume π → ρ and π satisfies HF(N P , A), and we prove ρ satisfies HF(N P , A). We do this by proving (i) if π satisfies ✷✸h(N P , A) then so does ρ and (ii) if ρ satisfies ✷✸A then so does π. Result (i) follows easily from Proposition 4; (ii) follows from the observation that, for any system action A i and behaviors σ and τ with σ ¤ τ , if infinitely many τ steps satisfy A i , then infinitely many σ steps also satisfy A i . The details are left as an exercise.
Conclusion
Fairness conditions are a way of expressing liveness properties, and liveness properties are inherently problematic. The question of whether a real system satisfies a liveness property is meaningless; it can be answered only by observing the system for an infinite length of time, and real systems don't run forever. Liveness is always an approximation to the property we really care about. We want a program to terminate within 100 years, but proving that it does would require the addition of distracting timing assumptions. So, we prove the weaker condition that the program eventually terminates. This doesn't prove that the program will terminate within our lifetimes, but it does demonstrate the absence of infinite loops.
In practice, almost all reactive systems can be specified using action systems together with simple weak and strong fairness properties. 13 Most specifications are machine closed. A machine-closed specification can always be written as an action system together with fairness properties only on disjunctions of system actions. However, in some cases, this requires a complicated representation of each system operation as the disjunction of infinitely many actions. For those cases, as well as for writing non-machine-closed specifications, we can use formulas of the form WF(A) or SF(A) when A is not simply the disjunction of system actions. The more general properties expressible with the GWF and GSF operators are rarely needed. A hyperfairness formula HF (N , A) is a particularly obscure example of such a property, since h(N , A) will be impossible to compute in any practical situation, if hyperfairness differs from strong fairness. It therefore seems safe to predict that hyperfairness will be of at most theoretical interest.
